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The theories of natural market structures have been well known in economics for a long 
time.  In this paper, a framework for such natural market structures is developed, where 
natural monopoly, natural oligopoly, perfect competition and monopolistic competition 
are special cases.  The paper explains why with increasing returns to scale at the level 
of the firm; a given market size; a continuum of firms; complete information and 
homogeneous goods, there is usually a margin for regulation –most notably when the 
number of firms in the market is low.  The paper shows that R&D, FDI and trade 
liberalization can improve welfare, and that they can be complements or imperfect 
substitutes to the need for market regulation.  It is argued that when markets are 
expected to grow, or technologies to change, avoiding policies that prevent entry of 
firms –such as licences- can reduce significantly the need for regulation while allowing 
for a more efficient allocation of resources.  It is also argued that the need for market 
regulation can be better explained by the exploitation of economies of scale, than by the 
existence of economic rents.  Finally, the paper shows that when there is a discrete 
number of firms, the level of profits and the regulatory margins, can be described by a 
“saw”. 
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UNA TEORÍA SOBRE ESTRUCTURAS DE MERCADOS NATURALES: 
REGULACIÓN, I&D, IED, COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL 




Las teorías sobre estructuras de mercados naturales han sido conocidas en economía 
desde hace bastante tiempo.  En este documento se desarrolla un marco general para 
tales estructuras de mercados naturales, donde monopolio natural, oligopolio natural, 
competencia perfecta y competencia monopolística son casos especiales.  El 
documento explica por qué con rendimientos crecientes a escala al nivel de la firma; un 
tamaño de mercado dado; un número continuo de firmas; información completa y un 
producto homogéneo, usualmente hay un margen para la regulación –más 
notablemente cuando el número de firmas en el mercado es bajo.  El documento 
muestra que la I&D, la IED y el comercio internacional pueden mejorar el bienestar, y 
que pueden ser complementos o sustitutos imperfectos a la necesidad de regular el 
mercado.  Se argumenta que cuando se espera que los mercados crezcan, o que 
cambien las tecnologías, evitar políticas que impiden la entrada de otras firmas –como 
las licencias- puede reducir significativamente la necesidad de regular y permitir a la 
vez una asignación más eficiente de recursos.  También se argumenta que la 
necesidad de regular el mercado puede ser explicada mejor por la explotación de 
economías de escala, que por la existencia de rentas económicas.  Finalmente, el 
documento muestra que cuando hay un número discreto de firmas, el nivel de 
ganancias y los márgenes regulatorios, pueden ser descritos por una “sierra”. 
 
Palabras clave:   Economías de escala, monopolio natural, oligopolio natural, 
competencia monopolística, regulación, comercio internacional, sierra de ganancias, 
sierra de regulación. 
 





The theories of natural market structures have been well known in economics for a long time.  In 
this paper, a framework for such natural market structures is developed, where natural 
monopoly, natural oligopoly, perfect competition and monopolistic competition are special cases.  
The paper explains why with increasing returns to scale at the level of the firm; a given market 
size; a continuum of firms; complete information and homogeneous goods, there is usually a 
margin for regulation –most notably when the number of firms in the market is low. 
 
The paper shows that research and development (R&D), foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
trade liberalization can improve welfare, and that they can be complements or imperfect 
substitutes to the need for market regulation.  It is argued that when markets are expected to 
grow, or technologies to change, avoiding policies that prevent entry of firms –such as licences- 
can reduce significantly the need for regulation while allowing for a more efficient allocation of 
resources.  It is also argued that the need for market regulation may be better explained by the 
exploitation of economies of scale, than by the existence of economic rents.  Finally, the paper 
shows that when there is a discrete number of firms, the level of profits and the regulatory 
margins, can be described by a “saw”. 
 
This research builds on the theoretical framework of Sutton (1991), in order to develop a simple 
but general model for analysing a wide range of natural market structures.  The model also 
gives insights into the role of regulation, trade, foreign investment and R&D policies, and some 
of their interactions. 
 
The content is organized as follows:  the next section reviews the previous literature; then the 
basic theoretical framework is spelled out, followed by three sections that look at the role of 
regulation; R&D and FDI; and international trade in goods and services and international 
migration.  The paper ends with some conclusions. 
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II. PREVIOUS  LITERATURE 
 
The theory of natural monopoly has been well known in economics for a long time.  According to 
Berg and Tschirahart (1988), early investigations of natural monopoly include Farrer (1902), 
Clark (1923, 1939) and Glaeser (1927).  More recent literature on natural monopoly and its 
regulation include Demsetz (1968), Kahn (1971), Baumol (1977), and Sharkey (1982). 
 
As pointed out by Hotelling (1938) and Dupuit (1952), the first best natural monopoly equilibrium 
is generated when price is set equal to marginal cost, and the monopolist is reimbursed –for 
example by the government- its fixed costs.  However, such a solution is not always fiscally and 
politically viable, and thus, as Braeutigam (1989) has pointed out, setting prices equal to 
average costs is a second best solution to the regulation of natural monopolies.  Mankiw (2001) 
has explained that in practice regulators tend to fix prices above average costs in order to 
promote cost reductions2. 
 
The theory of natural oligopoly (oligopoly with free entry and exit of firms) has been developed 
by authors such as Seade (1980), Frank (1965), Ruffin (1971) and Novshek (1980).  Perry 
(1984) has shown within oligopoly, that regulation with average cost pricing and a single 
producer can be an optimal policy when there are economies of scale in the relevant range of 
production. 
 
Perfect competition has been a benchmark market structure, at least for neoclassical 
economics.  Its development includes –not without controversy- contributions from many 
authors, including classical economists; marginalist economists such as Jevons (1871), Menger 
(1871), Cournot (1838), and Walras (1874); and Marshall (1920). 
 
With regard to monopolistic competition, which is also natural in the sense that there is free 
entry and exit of firms, first contributions are attributed to Chamberlin (1937 and 1956), with a 
more recent wave of contributions headed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
 
                                                           
2   Setting price equal to average costs would also induce cost reductions if the price set is fixed for a sufficiently long 
period of time.    
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In terms of models that attempt to cover several market structures, two references that are 
relevant for the purpose at hand are Sutton (1991) and von Weizsacker (1980).  Sutton 
develops a two stage game model with increasing returns to scale and an isoelastic demand 
curve and finds that larger markets lead to a greater number of firms at equilibrium.  Von 
Weizacker develops a model with “U” shaped average cost curves and concludes that with such 
costs, the endogenous number of firms may be greater than the welfare maximizing number of 
firms. 
 
III. BASIC  THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK 
 
The market structure assumed in this paper is one with a homogeneous good.  In order to 
concentrate on the main insights, the framework used in this paper is simplified as much as 













The paper also assumes that all firms operating in the market have identical cost structures with 
increasing returns to scale at the level of the firm, as follows: 
 
 
i i dq c TC + =  
 
The model generates natural market structures in the sense that the number of firms in the 
market is determined endogenously by the level of the fixed costs and the size of the market.  It 
is assumed that there are no other entry barriers established by the government or by the 
incumbents, and that technological and resource constraints are embedded in the cost 
structures of the firm.  It is also assumed to begin with, that when there is scope for strategic 
interactions, the existing firms compete in quantities as in Cournot. 
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A.  Short Run Equilibrium:  Profit Maximization 
 
In this model, firms are assumed to maximize profits in the short -and in the long- run.  The 
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Summing across all n firms: 
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B  Long Run Equilibrium:  Zero Profit Condition 
 


























The number of firms that will be able to operate in the market with zero profits will be: 



















































Summarizing, natural imperfect competition equilibrium prices, quantities and the number of 
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This means that in the long run equilibrium, the number of firms and the total quantities 
produced will increase –and the price will decrease- the larger is the demand (greater a and/or 
lower b) and the lower are the cost structures (lower c and/or lower d), and vice versa.    
  9
 
Note that in this context with identical cost structures and free entry and exit, a Cartel is not a 
long run equilibrium, since new firms would enter the market.  As the Cartel breaks, the final 
equilibrium will depend on whether the firms compete in quantities as in Cournot, or in prices as 
in Bertrand.  The Bertrand equilibrium would lead to only one firm operating and setting price 
equal to average cost, since any other configuration would not be a Nash Equilibrium in prices. 
 
Note also that if the fixed costs c are zero, the equilibrium price will be equal to the marginal 
cost, and the number of firms will tend to infinity, replicating the perfect equilibrium model. 
 
Finally, product differentiation can be introduced by simply assuming that each firm produces a 
differentiated good or service.  The model fits accurately in the monopolistic competition 
framework given that it already has embedded the profit maximization and the zero profit 
conditions. 
 
Table 1 shows different market structures as a special case of this generalized equilibrium. 
 
Table 1 
Natural Market Structures as a Special Case of the Model’s Equilibrium 
 Number  of  Firms  Product  Price  Quantity 
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 Differentiated  cb d +  
b
cb d a − −
 




                                                           
3   Oligopoly with differentiated products can also be analysed using this same framework.    
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C Welfare  Analysis 
 
Given that firms have zero profits, and that all factors of production are paid their opportunity 
costs, welfare changes can be expressed in terms of changes in consumer surplus.  These 
changes in consumer’s surplus can be expressed as the difference between the final 
consumers’ surplus, and the initial consumers’ surplus.  To do so, the demand in the initial 
period 0 can be written as 
 
 
0 0 0 0 Q b a p − =  
 
and the demand in the final period 1 can be written as: 
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Given that all quantities are non-negative, welfare will improve if 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
4   Perfect competition can be simulated in this model by considering the case where c tends to zero (no fixed 
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This means that if  b  remains unchanged, increases in equilibrium quantities are enough to 
guarantee increases in welfare.  Thus, from equation (4), increases in the demand intercept a, 
and decreases in the fixed costs c and the marginal costs d, would lead to increases in welfare.  
Note also from equation (3), that these changes would also increase the equilibrium number of 
firms and with product differentiation and a taste for variety, this could reinforce even more the 
positive effects on welfare. 
 


























This means that welfare increases in this model when b decreases.  Summarizing, welfare in 
this model increases (decreases) when a increases (decreases) and when b, c and d decrease 
(increase). 
 
D. Efficiency  Analysis 
 
Consider how efficient is the allocation generated at the different market equilibriums.  If there 
are no fixed costs, setting price equal to marginal cost will be a first best allocation, as is the 
case in the perfect competition scenario.  As shown before, in this case 













If there are fixed costs in the relevant range of production, then the first best allocation will also 
be the one obtained when price equals marginal costs, as pointed by Hotelling (1938) and 
Dupuit (1952).  This case is shown in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
First and Second Best Allocations in the Model Developed 
Taken from Braeutigam (1989) p. 1300 
 
 
However, in this case firms will have loses, so the producers will have to be reimbursed their 
fixed costs if they are to produce at price equal to marginal cost.  Such reimbursement may not 
be feasible because of fiscal and/or political reasons.  So a second best allocation would be to 
fix price equal to average cost, as pointed out by Perry (1984) and Braeutigam (1989).  In this 
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The second best quantities will be identical to the natural market structure quantities if 
()bc d a 2 = − .  But this is the case of natural monopoly.  Else, the second best quantities will 
be higher than the quantities of the natural oligopoly equilibrium, even if all market structures 
yield zero economic rents5.  Note also that monopoly with price equal to average cost is the 
Bertrand equilibrium, and this means that in this context, the Bertrand equilibrium is a second 




As noted above, a perfect competition market would not require any regulation at all, since 
prices would be set equal to the marginal costs.  But with the existence of fixed costs, markets 
alone would not generate an efficient allocation, so there would be room for regulation.  In order 
to make this clearer, define the regulatory margin RM as the natural market price shown in 
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equation (6) minus the price desired by the regulator.  The price desired by the regulator may be 
–for example- the first best price –equal to marginal cost- or the second best price –equal to 
average cost-, depending on the constraints that it faces. 
 
A.  Analysis with a Continuum of Firms 
 
The analysis of regulation with a continuum of firms will be divided between first best and 
second best pricing. 
 
1.  Regulation with First Best Pricing 
 
If the regulator is able to set the price equal to the marginal cost, the regulatory margin with first 
best pricing RMFB could be described as: 
 
  d cb d RMFB − + =  
  cb RMFB =  (8) 
 
This means the regulatory margin with first best pricing will be higher the higher are the fixed 
costs and the higher is the demand slope, and will be zero if the fixed cost is zero (c = 0), or if 
the price is given (b = 0).  This also means that the regulatory margin does not depend on the 
marginal cost d and the demand intercept a.  The regulatory margin with first best pricing as a 





RMFB = *  (9) 
 
Note that RMFB* will tend to infinity when the marginal costs tend to zero.  Note also that 
achieving the first best price would not only require subsidies.  It would also reduce the number 
of firms to one if the level of subsidies is to be minimized.  Thus, if there is monopolistic 
competition, achieving a first best equilibrium will be optimal only if the welfare gains ∆W 
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more than compensate the welfare loss due to the loss of varieties, and the costs of regulation –
including the resources used to regulate and the inefficiencies of the regulatory process. 
 
2.  Regulation with Second Best Pricing 
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As before, these second best prices will be identical to the natural market equilibrium prices if 
()cb d a 2 = − .  But this is the case of natural monopoly.  This means that there is no need to 
regulate a natural monopoly with second best pricing when there is a continuum of firms.  If 
()cb d a 2 > − , the second best prices will be lower than the prices of the natural market 
equilibrium, even if all market structures yield zero economic rents, so there will be room for 
regulation in this case. 
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Note that RMSB will be equal to zero if there are no fixed costs (c = 0), of if the market price is 
given (b = 0). 
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Defining the regulatory margin with second best pricing as a percentage of the second best 
price RMSB* as: 
 
( )
() bc d a d a











− − − +
− − + + −
=
−
=  (11) 
 
This expression is non-linear in the number of firms.  If n = 1 (for example because 
()cb d a 2 = − ), RMSB* = 0.  If n tends to infinity (for example because c or b tend to zero) 
RMSB* = 0.  But if 1 < n < ∞, RMSB* > 0.  Thus, although firms have zero profits, in general 
there will be room for optimal regulation since one firm is more efficient than several firms due to 
increasing returns to scale.  To see this graphically, a simulation is presented in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
Regulatory Margin as a percentage of the Second Best Price 
















































































Number of Firms (as b changes)
 
 
Note that given the parameters used for the simulation, with one firm there is no need for 
regulation, while with more than one firm, the natural market price can be above the second best 
price by up to 58%.  This means that regulation can improve the allocation of resources even if 
the firms in the market have zero profits.  Note also that in this particular case the highest room    
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for regulation (the highest RMSB*) occurs when there are more than two firms, and that beyond 
a given number of firms, the scope for market regulation is fairly small. 
 
As with first best price regulation, second best price regulation implies leaving only one firm in 
the market.  Thus, if there is monopolistic competition, achieving a second best equilibrium will 
be optimal only if the efficiency gains more than compensate the welfare loss due to the loss of 
varieties, and the costs of regulation –including the resources used to regulate and the 
inefficiencies of the regulatory process. 
 
B.  Analysis with a Discrete Number of Firms 
 
The previous analysis assumed that there was a continuum of firms in the market.  If there are a 
discrete number of firms, the analysis changes.  Remember that with a discrete number of firms, 












When there are a discrete number of firms, it is possible for the existing firms to make economic 
profits, as long as a new firm cannot enter the market with non-negative profits.  The price with a 












The difference between the price charged with a discrete number of firms and the zero profit 
price charged when there is a continuum number of firms, which will be labelled here as the 
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Such regulatory margin induced by profits, as a percentage of the free entry and exit price, can 
be expressed as RMPR* 
 
  ()
() () cb d n









The behaviour of RMPR* resembles that of a seesaw, and can be seen in the simulation 
presented in figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 
Profit Seesaw:  Regulatory Margin Induced by Profits when there is a 
Discrete Number of Firms, as a Percentage of the Market Price with a Continuum of Firms 












Number of firms (as b changes)
RMPR Monopoly Price as a Share of the Natural Market Price
 
 
Figure 3 shows that if the market size is expected to increase through decreases in the demand 
slope b, avoiding the use of licences -or any other policy that prevents the entry of firms- may be 
a powerful tool to reduce the need for regulation, while allowing for a more efficient allocation of 
resources.  Similar results can be obtained if market size increases through an increase in a, or 
if cost structures fall through a fall in c and/or d, because all of these changes in parameters    
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lead to a higher equilibrium -and in this case discrete- number of firms, as can be deduced from 
equation (3). 
 
The doted line in figure 3 represents the RMPR* as b falls, with one firm and complete entry 
barriers.  Every vertical line represents the entry of an additional firm.  Thus, the RMPR* as b 
falls -with more firms and complete entry barriers- can be found as the projection of the positive 
–but non vertical- slope corresponding to the desired number of firms 
 








RMFBD          ( 1 2 )  
 
This means that the regulatory margin will be higher the higher the intersection of the demand 
curve with the price axis a, and the lower the marginal costs and the number of firms. 
 











The RMFBD is equal to the sum of RMFB plus RMPR.  This shows two possible sources for 
regulation:  the exploitation of economies of scale (captured by RMFB), and economic rents 
(captured by RMPR).  Note that the regulatory margin from exploiting economies of scale as in 









         ( 1 3 )  
 
The regulatory margin with second best pricing and a discrete number of firms RMSBD is equal 
to the sum of RMSB plus RMPR.  These margins are shown in the simulation presented in 
figure 4.    
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Figure 4 
Composition of the Second Best Regulatory Margin with a Discrete Number of Firms, 
as a percentage of the Second Best Price 














Number of firms (as b changes)
RMSB RMSB(D) = RMSB+RMPR
 
 
Note that in the case of the simulation at hand, the gross of the regulatory margin is given by the 
exploitation of economies of scale, rather than by the economic rents, especially when there are 
two or more firms.  This suggests that in terms of the need for regulation, with free entry and exit 
the exploitation of economies of scale can be more relevant than the existence of economic 
rents, as occurs with first best regulation when equation (13) is fulfilled.  Note also that the 
scope for market regulation is fairly small beyond a given number of firms.  The analysis 
presented so far also means that with a discrete number of firms there is no need to regulate a 
natural monopoly that has no profits, since the regulatory margin is zero. 
 
The simulation of figure 4 also shows that with monopoly, the margin of regulation can shift from 
cero, to the highest level of all.  This means that if markets are expected to expand and/or costs 
are expected to decrease, regulation may be important, especially if the number of firms that 
enter freely to the market is small. 
 




Summary of the Regulatory Results 
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V.  RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 
In order to evaluate the effects of R&D and FDI, consider the impacts in the case of a continuum 
of firms8.  In terms of welfare, reducing costs through higher R&D or through greater FDI will 
lead to lower fixed costs and/or to lower marginal costs, that should lead to lower prices, as 
shown in equation (6).  Ceteris paribus, falls in prices will lead to greater quantities and as 
shown in equation (7), this will generate higher welfare. 
 
If R&D and/or FDI lower fixed costs and increase marginal costs or vice versa, it would be 














+ + =  
                                                           
6   The profit margin appers only when a discrete number of firms is considered. 
7   The regulatory margins with a discrete number of firms are equal to the margins with a continuum of firms (scale 
economies effect) and the profit margins. 
8   With a continuum of firms all impacts are generated by the economies of scales effect, while with a discrete 
number of firms the impacts are generated by the economies of scale effect and the economic rents effect.    
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Setting the change in b equal to zero, there will be a welfare gain if the marginal costs fall and 










Setting the change in b equal to zero, there will be a welfare gain if the marginal costs increase 










If the overall impact of R&D and FDI is an increase in the number of firms as in equation (3), 
then they would lead to another source of welfare improvements if product differentiation and a 
taste for variety are introduced in the model. 
 
Reductions in the fixed costs will reduce the absolute regulatory margin as shown in equation 
(8).  This means that if R&D and FDI reduce –but do not remove- c, they would be imperfect 
substitutes of regulation, independently of what happens to the marginal costs.  Furthermore, if 
R&D and FDI remove c, they will be perfect substitutes of regulation. 
 
With regard to the interaction between of R&D and FDI, with the regulator setting first best 


















* − + =  
 
Thus, R&D and FDI that increase fixed costs and/or reduce marginal costs, increase even more 
the need for regulation.  This means that in this case R&D and FDI are complements to 
regulation. 
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Also, with second best regulation, changes in cost structures through R&D and FDI will have 
non linear effects on the regulatory margin and thus, they may be complements or imperfect 
substitutes of market regulation. 
 
If a discrete number of firms are considered, then note that R&D and FDI that lower marginal 
costs increase the need for regulation with first best pricing, for a given number of firms as 
shown in equation (12).  But a lower d also increases the number of firms, reducing the need for 
regulation every time a new firm enters the market.  Note also that the fixed costs no longer 
have a direct impact on the price margin as shown in equation (12).  However, changes in fixed 
costs will have an indirect impact through changes in the discrete number of firms.  This means 
that changes in the fixed and marginal costs will have non-linear impacts on the need for 
regulation, that is, that changes in costs structures can be either complements or imperfect 
substitutes to the need for market regulation. 
 
VI.  INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF GOODS AND SERVICES AND INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRATION 
 
In order to study the impacts of international trade and migration, consider once more the model 
with a continuum of firms.  The welfare effects of having freer trade can be understood in this 
model as having a larger market perceived by producers, even though the domestic demand 
remains unchanged.  The impact of having producers perceiving a greater market demand can 
be understood in terms of a higher a and/or a lower b.  With homogeneous goods, a higher a 
would not affect prices and with a constant domestic demand, national welfare would not 
change.  But a higher a would imply more firms participating in the domestic market (national 
and foreign) and -with product differentiation and a taste for variety- higher welfare. 
 
With a lower b perceived by the firms (because of the combined domestic and foreign 











    
 24
Thus, with a lower b the equilibrium price will be lower because of exploitation of economies of 
scales, and national welfare –measured in terms of the unchanged domestic demand-, will be 
higher.  Note that if this is the case, the number of firms participating in the market (domestic 
and foreign) will also increase, as in equation (1). 
 
All of the above means that a country that expects increases in market size –for example from 
regional trade agreements and/or multilateral trade negotiations- should avoid licensing 
monopolies and/or oligopolies, or at least do so for the shortest possible period of time. As with 
R&D and FDI, increases in market size with differentiated products could be another source of 
welfare improvement, if consumers appreciate variety. 
 
However and as demonstrated in Appendix 1, the number of firms operating in the market with 
free trade will be lower than the sum of the number of firms operating under autarky because 
 
 
() B A B A
B A









The larger scale of operation per remaining firm, and the disappearance of some firms could 
explain –but not justify- some resistance to trade liberalization, even if it is welfare improving. 
 
In terms of the optimal number of firms with free trade, setting price equal to marginal costs will 
lead to the optimal level of consumption.  But the greater the number of firms operating under 
such scheme, the larger the reimbursements for fixed costs.  Thus, in the first best scenario and 
with homogeneous goods, the optimal price equals the marginal cost, and the optimal number of 
firms is one.  This means that even with free trade, if goods are homogeneous, optimal 
regulation could still be welfare improving as long as b does not tend to zero -as in equations 
(8), (9), (10) and (11)- and as long as those welfare improvements are higher than the regulation 
costs –including the cost of resources used to regulate and the inefficiencies of the regulatory 
process.  If goods are not homogeneous, there would be a trade off between having a more 
efficient allocation, and benefiting from having more varieties, while avoiding the regulation costs 
mentioned above. 
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Thus, freer international trade increases welfare by promoting more efficiency and allowing for 
more varieties, but in general, it does not eliminate the need for regulation.  Even with free trade, 
regulation could improve national and international welfare by forcing one producer to provide 
the world at average cost, maximizing the gains from economies of scale.  As before, if 
regulating is costly, ensuring that no policies -such as licences- prevent the entry of firms is a 
powerful tool to reduce the need for regulation, while ensuring a more efficient allocation of 
resources.  Note also from equation (9) that if R&D and FDI increase the fixed costs and 
decrease the marginal costs, opening up to freer trade may compensate –at least in part- the 
impact on the increased need for market regulation caused by the changes in cost structures. 
 
Migration analysis can be introduced in the model by thinking in terms of the movement of 
consumers, and in this sense, the framework presented in this paper replicates most insights 
developed in Krugman (1979) with love of variety preferences, and Vallejo (2005) with ideal 
variety preferences.  Consider two countries A and B that are identical and that have a market in 
terms of the basic framework developed in this paper.  Suppose now that these two countries 
allow free movement of consumers between them, and that those shifts are captured through 
the parameter b.  Prices and welfare would be identical, and there would be no incentive for 
migration since 
B B A A cb d p cb d p + = = + = .  However, this equilibrium would be 
unstable since the movement of one consumer to the other country –for example of a consumer 
from  A to B- would imply that welfare would be higher in the receiving country because 
B B A A cb d p cb d p + = > + = .  Thus, there would be incentives for all consumers to 
move from the source country to the receiving country.  In the end, all consumers would end up 
in the receiving country and would have higher welfare because of a lower b and a lower p. 
 
In terms of GNP, with migration –for example from A to B- all consumers from both countries 
would be better off than before.  However, GDP would fall in the source country.  If some 
consumers could not migrate to the receiving country, the consumers left in the source country 
would be worse off (because of a higher b in equation (6)), and that could lead to political 
barriers to the exit of consumers in the source country. 
 
Besides, if both countries have the same size but different technologies, the country with the 
best technologies –for example A- would have the lowest prices and the highest welfare    
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(because of lower c and/or d in equation (6)), and would receive all migrants since 
B B A A cb d p cb d p + = < + = .  However, if one country (A) has a better technology 
than the other, but the other (B) has a sufficiently larger market to more than compensate the 
technological advantage and to have lower autarky prices 
(
B B A A cb d p cb d p + = > + = )  and higher welfare, free migration could lead all 
consumers to the technologically disadvantaged nation.  In this case, the model would suggest 
that there could be sub-optimal migration flows because world welfare would not be maximized. 
 
In terms of the impacts of migration on regulatory margins, the analysis is similar to that of 
international trade of goods and services, discussed earlier. 
 
With a discrete number of firms, an increase in a due to an inflow of consumers, does not affect 
the price and with a given domestic demand, does not affect welfare either.  However a lower b 
due to international migration with a constant domestic demand has an indirect impact on the 
need for regulation through the changes in the number of firms.  As b falls and the number of 
firms increases (in a discrete way), the need for regulation is reduced (freer migration is an 




This paper has developed a general and simplified framework based on two simple equations -
one for a linear demand and the other for a cost structure with increasing returns to scale-, in 
which a wide range of natural market structures –such as monopoly, Cournot oligopoly, Bertrand 
oligopoly, monopolistic competition and perfect competition- can be analyzed in terms of only 
four underlying parameters. 
 
The model has been used to study the effects of regulation, R&D, FDI, and international trade of 
goods, services and factors.  It has been shown that in natural market structures there is usually 
room for regulation.  With a discrete number of firms, the model has shown that profits of the 
firms and the regulatory margins can be graphed by a “saw”.  The use of a discrete number of 
firms has also suggested that the exploitation of economies of scale can be more relevant as an 
argument for market regulation, than the existence of economic rents.    
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It has also been shown that R&D and FDI can improve welfare providing they reduce cost 
structures or fulfil certain conditions.  Greater international trade of goods and services has also 
been shown to enhance welfare.  With homogenous products, welfare gains are generated by 
the exploitation of economies of scale at home and abroad.  However, with international trade 
some firms are likely to disappear.  International migration has been shown to increase Gross 
National Income, and to decrease Gross Domestic Product in the source country, leading to 
potential barriers to the exit of consumers.  It has also been shown that with technological 
differences among countries, there may be sub-optimal migration flows.  In this sense, the 
model has allowed to replicate results obtained by other authors in the context of much more 
elaborated frameworks. 
 
The model has explained that R&D, FDI, international trade of goods and services and 
international migration, can improve welfare with product differentiation and a taste for variety, 
when they induce a larger number of equilibrium firms (national and foreign).  The model has 
also shown that R&D, FDI, international trade of goods and services and international migration, 
can be either complements or imperfect substitutes to market regulation.  It has also been 
shown that if markets are expected to grow –for example as a result of trade liberalization- or 
technologies are expected to change –for example because of R&D and/or FDI-, avoiding 
policies that prevent the entry of firms –such as licences- can reduce the need for regulation 
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ENTRY AND EXIT OF FIRMS WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADE9 
 
With international trade, the number of firms operating in a market will increase.  However, some 
firms will disappear since the final number of firms operating with free trade will be lower than 
the sum of the firms operating in autarky. 
 
In order to demonstrate that this is the case, note that the slope of the demand with free trade 
bFT can be determined by adding horizontally the domestic demand (with sub-index A) and the 



































































Some of the original firms will disappear, as has been explained by Krugman (1979) with love of 
variety preferences, and by Vallejo (2005) with ideal variety preferences, if the following 
condition is met 
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9   I am endebted to Pietro Bonaldi for his contribution to this demostration.    
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Assuming that there is at least one firm in each country, from the market existence conditions for 



















Note that for  
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the following condition must be met 
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Since bA ≥ and bB ≥ 0, this implies that 
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Thus, if both countries have at least one firm each, this will be sufficient (but not necessary) to 
demonstrate that with free trade, although the total number of firms operating in the market 
(national and foreign) will increase in both countries, some firms will disappear. 
 